Tsvetan Theophanov [1]
Sofia University “St. Kliment Ohridski”
Sofia, Bulgaria
Abstract: Tariq Ramadan, born in 1962 in Geneva into a prominent Egyptian family, is one of the famous Muslim intellectuals in Europe, often appearing in public debates about Islam, modernity, multiculturalism, and Western society. He has presented himself as an advocate of the so-called “European Islam” (“Euro-Islam”) – a synthesis of Islamic ethics with European citizenship and modern democracy, rooted in Islamic tradition but engaged with democratic values, human rights, and pluralism. Ramadan is a controversial person. For supporters, he represents the possibility of a confident, modern Muslim identity in Europe. For critics, he embodies fears about hidden Islamist influence in Western societies. Supporters see him as a bridge-builder between Islam and the West, while critics accuse him of having a “double discourse” – moderate in public but sympathetic to Islamist views in private.
Keywords: Tariq Ramadan, “European Islam” (“Euro-Islam”), the Muslim Brotherhood, Islamic Reformism, “Double Discourse”
INTRODUCTION
Tariq Ramadan is often described as a “bridge figure” between Muslim communities and Western societies, even as his views spark sharp disagreements (ChengQi 2025: 124–131). His “Euro-Islam” is a project of Islamic reform for Muslims in Europe: grounded in tradition, critical of both secular assimilation and Islamist rigidity, and oriented toward producing ethical, active European Muslim citizens who contribute to pluralist societies without losing their religious identity.
Methodologically, Ramadan proposes reform from within. He reads Islamic sources through the lens of wasaṭīah(moderation) and the higher objectives of Sharia (justice, dignity, welfare), arguing these principles allow flexible application in Western contexts without betraying core commitments. His tools are classical jurisprudential concepts (analogy, public interest, ethical axioms) combined with contemporary political theory (Rawlsian overlapping consensus, Habermasian deliberation).
Classic Islamic law divided the world into dār al-Islām (abode of Islam) vs. dār al-ḥarb (abode of war), but these terms are all subject to disagreement and modification if necessary, and that the permanent settlement of Muslims in Europe and the negative image of Islam in the West provide the necessary and sufficient conditions for critique and reform. Europe is neither hostile territory nor temporary exile. Instead: Muslims are “at home” in Europe. They must see themselves as citizens and believers simultaneously, without conflict (Ramadan 2010: 123–131).
Many European intellectuals and policymakers, including Muslims, distrust Ramadan’s intentions, seeing him as ambiguous or double-speaking – someone who uses moderate language in public, but allegedly conceals conservative and even radical aims (Ibn Warraq 2008; Anonimous 2019).
REINTERPRETATION OF HASSAN Al-BANNA’S POLITICAL ISLAM WITHOUT BETRAYAL
Tariq Ramadan is the grandson of Hassan al-Banna (1906–1949), the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood (al-ikhwān al-muslimūn), established in Egypt in 1928. This organization began as a religious and social reform movement but quickly became a political force opposing Western colonialism and secular Arab regimes (Krämer 2022: 243–296; Wagemakers 2021: 210–218; Willi 2021: 112–121).
Tariq’s father, Said Ramadan (1926– 1995), was one of Hassan al-Banna’s closest disciples and married al-Banna’s beloved daughter (Tariq’s mother). Said was a prominent member of the Muslim Brotherhood and helped spread its message internationally. He was also deeply political activist. After Nasser’s crackdown on the Brotherhood in the 1950s Said went into exile – first to Saudi Arabia, then to Pakistan, and finally to Switzerland, where he settled in Geneva. He founded there in 1961 the Centre Islamique de Genève, which became a hub for Muslim intellectuals and exiles. Western intelligence agencies (including the CIA) reportedly supported Said at times, seeing the Brotherhood as a bulwark against communism, which adds another layer of intrigue to the family’s story (Johnson 2010: 104–235).
To understand Tariq Ramadan’s “Euro-Islam” in relation to Hassan al-Banna’s original Muslim Brotherhood ideology, we must look at how each responds to modernity, politics, and the West, but from different historical contexts. What’s fascinating is that Ramadan’s thought is not a rejection of his grandfather’s vision, but rather a transformation of it – a “translation” from 1930s Egypt to 21st-century Europe. Tariq Ramadan stands between legacy and innovation – a grandson trying to rewrite his inheritance in a postmodern key.
Hassan al-Banna’s movement was a response to Western domination – military, political, and cultural. Tariq Ramadan’s project is a response to Muslim marginalization within the West – cultural, spiritual, and civic. Both are, in their own way, projects of resistance, but the “enemy” has changed.
Ramadan’s thought takes a distinct direction from traditional Islamist ideology. He advocates “reformism” (iṣlāḥ) – a renewal (tajdīd) of Islamic thinking that remains loyal to the core of the Qur’an and Sunna, while reinterpreting them for the modern, pluralist, Western context. Ramadan believes that the principles of Islam are universal, but their application must adapt to time, place, and context (fiqh al-wāqi‘– jurisprudence of reality). This is a fundamental idea in his work: reinterpretation without betrayal.
“EURO-ISLAM”: A VISION OF FAITHFUL INTEGRATION
At the core of Ramadan’s work lies the idea of “Euro-Islam” – a call for Muslims living in Europe to cultivate a distinctly European Muslim identity. This vision rejects both isolationism and assimilation. According to Ramadan, Muslims should neither retreat into “Islamic enclaves” nor abandon their faith to conform to secular norms. Instead, they should become “model law-abiding citizens” who contribute to the moral and social development of European
societies. His project rests on the principle that Islam’s ethical and spiritual teachings are universal and can be expressed authentically in diverse cultural contexts. Rather than viewing Islam as an external civilization, Ramadan argues that its wisdom – justice, dignity, and solidarity – can enrich the pluralistic values of the West (Ramadan 2004: 51–54).
The doctrine of “Euro-Islam” is not merely theological. It reflects a larger question about Europe’s capacity to integrate religious diversity without erasing it. As scholars such as Jocelyne Cesari have observed, the negotiation between secularism and Islam in Europe involves redefining citizenship itself (Cesari 2004: 161–162). Ramadan’s project implicitly asks whether European secularism can evolve from mere tolerance to genuine pluralism – one that allows Islam to participate in the public sphere without suspicion.
By defending Muslims’ right to engage as Muslims in democratic life, Ramadan redefines belonging as inclusive rather than conditional. Yet, the controversies surrounding him also expose persistent anxieties: the fear of cultural fragmen-tation, the endurance of Orientalist stereotypes, and the unresolved tension between universal values and particular religious identities (Bowen 2009: 50, 146, 168, 171).
Tariq Ramadan’s ideas matter because they offer a nonviolent, intellectual alternative to radicalism, challenge both Islamic fundamentalism and Western Islamophobia, and reimagine Europe as a shared moral project, not just a geographic space.
His concept of “Euro-Islam” proposes a “middle way” for Muslims living in Europe (and more broadly, the West). The term wasaṭīah means moderation or balance. It suggests that Muslims can remain loyal to Islamic values and principles, while engaging positively with Western cultures. The goal is to integrate – not by abandoning faith, but by adapting it thoughtfully to Western contexts.
Tariq Ramadan has also critiqued both rigid literalist interpretations of Islam and simplistic secularist assessments of religion. He occupies what we might call a “third space” – neither the secular Western intellectual tradition nor thetraditional Muslim ulama class, but an in-between zone where both languages meet.
Ramadan believes that peaceful coexistence between Islam and the West can be achieved through: reforming Islamic education (encouraging Muslims in Europe to reinterpret Islamic teachings in ways that respond to modern realities); dialogue among civilizations (promoting mutual understanding between Muslims and non-Muslims); reconstructing civic ethics (fostering shared moral and social values that fit both Islamic and European frameworks); encouraging civic participation (motivating Muslims to take active roles in public life – politics, community work, social engagement). Together, these actions can create an “overlapping consensus” (a term from philosopher John Rawls meaning shared agreement on key moral and civic principles despite cultural or religious differences) (Rawls 2013: 51). This leads to symbiotic reconciliation – a peaceful, mutually beneficial coexistence between Muslims and Christians in Europe.
Ramadan distinguishes between Sharia as principles (justice, dignity, equality) and fiqh as interpretations. Many fiqhrulings were context-specific (e.g., medieval inheritance rules, gender segregation etc.). In Europe, Muslims should reformulate fiqh in a way compatible
with local laws – without betraying ethical foundations. For example, Muslims can accept secular laws on finance, gender, and family, as long as justice and dignity are preserved (Ramadan 2004: 31–61).
The controversialist Ramadan, who claims to be a very modern universalist, insists on gender equality as an Islamic principle. He rejects both Western stereotypes of Muslim women as oppressed and patriarchal Muslim practices that deny rights. But unlike radical feminists (e.g., Amina Wadud) (Ali 2012: 17–58), he avoids revolutionary reinterpretations – preferring gradual reform based on ethics (Ramadan 2009: 207–224). Ramadan, for example, concedes that stoning may be supported in part of the Muslim world and by the instructions of law books. But such punishment, he argues, should be suspended while a debate is held over the conditions of its actual application (Ramadan 2005; Lesprit 2023).
TARIQ RAMADAN VS. BASSAM TIBI
The Syrian-German political scientist Bassam Tibi shares a completely different concept of “Euro-Islam” compared to Tariq Ramadan (Hashas 2019: 37–116). The Ramadan–Tibi opposition defines the two main intellectual directions of Islam in Europe today:
– The internal reform path (Ramadan): reform from within Islam; emphasizes identity, ethics, and dialogue; keeps a strong spiritual dimension; appeals to practicing Muslims who want to integrate without losing faith;
– The secular modernization path (Tibi): reform through Western rationalism; emphasizes political loyalty, science, and secular democracy; de-emphasizes religion’s public role; appeals to policymakers, secular Muslims, and European institutions.
The both scholars articulate divergent blueprints for what “Euro-Islam” should mean. Ramadan advances a faith-based, internal reform that reconceives Islam’s ethical and juridical resources as compatible with and enriching of European civic life, thereby enabling a model of “double belonging” in which Muslim religious identity and European citizenship are mutually reinforcing.
Tibi, on the opposite, frames belonging as predicated on the secular, Enlightenment-inspired cores of European modernity, urging an external modernization whereby Islam must be rationalized, privatized, and subordinated to liberal secular norms if it is to be a stable component of European polity (Tibi 2008: 153–234). The dispute thus hinges on foundational questions about modernity (plural vs. universal), the role of religion in the public sphere (inclusive pluralism vs. strict privatization), and the normative priority between communal moral vocabularies and universal civic principles.
Their difference has practical implications for policy on secularism, legal pluralism, education, and gender equality. Ramadan’s prescriptions favour institutionally accommodated religious expression and reforming theological education, while Tibi’s favor robust secular institutions, uniform civic schooling, and the privatization of religion – differences that reflect deeper disagreements over whether Europe should adapt to religious diversity or whether Islam must adapt to Europe.
Tariq Ramadan and Bassam Tibi offer antithetical visions of what “Euro-Islam” might entail, reflecting deeply divergent philosophies of modernity, religion and public life. Ramadan proposes a model rooted in what he calls wasaṭīah (moderation) whereby Muslims in Europe retain a robust faith-identity while embracing full citizenship in Western societies, advocating institutional frameworks for ethical Islamic education, civic participation and a kind of “double-belonging” as both Muslim and European.
On the opposite, Bassam Tibi presents “Euro-Islam” essentially as Islam’s Europeanization: a reform whereby religion is privatized and subordinated to secular liberal norms – human rights, democracy, separation of religion and state – and Muslims become “European citizens of the heart” by conforming to the Enlightenment rationalist template. The dispute between the two scholars therefore hinges on normative foundational questions: is modernity fundamentally plural (allowing religiously informed public moralities) as Ramadan suggests, or is it a universal secular order that religion must adapt to, as Tibi insists?
In terms of practical implications, Ramadan favours visible religious institutions and a pluralistic public culture, whereas Tibi emphasizes uniform secular institutions, civic education and the privatization of faith – differences that illuminate contrasting policy responses on secularism (laïcité), legal pluralism and gender reform. Thus this epistemic contest is not simply about integration but about the very architecture of modern public space and the place of religion within it.
Both projects rest on empirical assumptions subject to critique. Ramadan’s optimism about mutual enrichment presumes sufficient reciprocity in host societies and an ability of Muslim communities to internalize democratic norms. Critics point to persistent discrimination, structural inequalities, and cultural pugilism that make such reciprocity fragile.
Tibi’s modernist optimism presumes that secularization necessarily produces liberal tolerance and social integration. Critics counter that enforced privatization of religion can generate alienation, underground religiosity, or identitarian backlash. Empirical evidence from European cities is mixed – success stories of Muslim political participation exist alongside ghettos and segregation – so both theories must engage with complex, localized realities.
JOCELYNE CESARI’S READING OF RAMADAN’S “EURO-ISLAM”
The famous French political scientist and Islamic studies scholar Jocelyne Cesari reads Tariq Ramadan’s “Euro-Islam” project as a significant, pragmatic response to the distinctive minority condition of Muslims in Europe. Rather than a radical doctrinal reform, Ramadan offers a programme of contextualizing Islamic sources so that Muslim faith may be lived faithfully within European legal and civic frameworks.
Cesari situates Ramadan among the new, transnational leaders who gain authority through publication, lectures and media rather than through traditional mosque hierarchies, and she treats his emphasis on spirituality, ethics and minority jurisprudence as a symptom of the wider individualization and “secularization” of Muslim practice in diasporic contexts (Cesari 2012: 435). At the same time, she is cautious: the realization of a stable, institution-embedded “European Islam” is constrained by weakened local institutions, ongoing transnational theological competition, and the securitizing and discriminatory policies of host societies – structural conditions that mean Ramadan’s programme, however influential, cannot by itself guarantee institutional integration or depoliticize contested public spaces.
For Cesari, the defining feature of Muslim life in Europe is not a fixed doctrinal difference but the minority situation itself: living as a religious minority inside secular nation-states shapes practices, institutions and claims-making strategies. This minority condition produces specific social dynamics: individualization of belief, privatization or ethical re-framing of religion, institutional weakness of traditional authorities. It must be taken as the starting point for any assessment of projects like Ramadan’s “European Islam.” Cesari therefore reads Ramadan not primarily as a theological innovator but as one of several actors responding to the constraints and opportunities of minority life (Cesari 2004: 151–153).
She recognizes the core of Ramadan’s programme – the attempt to re-situate Islamic sources so that Muslims can be full participants in European public life while remaining loyal to Islamic norms. Ramadan’s works (notably To Be a European Muslim and Western Muslims and the Future of Islam) proscribe a project of rooting practice and ethics in local (European) legal and cultural frameworks rather than importing foreign juridical models. Cesari treats this as an important, pragmatic response to the dilemmas of the minority condition.
She documents a structural change in the sources of religious authority among European Muslims: the weakening of traditional institutions (state-recognized councils, local imams trained in sending countries) and the simultaneous rise of transnational, media-visible intellectuals and “new leaders” (of whom Ramadan is a paradigmatic example).
Cesari stresses that much of what Ramadan proposes is pragmatic reinterpretation (how to practise, how to orient identity) rather than wholesale reform of core doctrines. She reads his emphasis on spirituality, ethics and minority jurisprudence as part of a broader trend toward the secularization (in the sociological sense) of practice. Muslims increasingly express religion as ethical orientations and private practices rather than as institutional legalism. Cesari therefore sees Ramadan’s project as compatible with, and in some respects a response to, the social pressures that produce individualized forms of religiosity.
While Cesari gives Ramadan credit for seeking a “European” rootedness for Islam, she (and other scholars she cites) also point to an ambiguity or plural register in his discourse. In contexts oriented to public dialogue he advances accommodation and civic participation. In other settings he has, according to critics cited by Cesari, used language or given advice that appears less acceding to secular norms (e.g., stronger communal claims about dress, halalprovisioning, etc.). Cesari therefore treats Ramadan as both constructive (building resources for civic presence) and as emblematic of the limits of personalist, charismatic leadership when institutionalization is weak – i.e. the very visibility that gives him influence also produces contested, sometimes contradictory receptions.
Beyond the Ramadan’s case, Cesari warns that European Muslim identity is shaped by globalised religious flows (funding, theology, media) and by the politics of securitization/Islamophobia. She locates Ramadan’s project inside this contested field: while he argues for a localized “Euro-Islam”, the broader ecology includes influences (Wahhabi streams, Brotherhood networks, na-
tional political struggles) that complicate the realization of a stable, institutionally embedded “European Islam.” Cesari therefore treats Ramadan’s initiative as promising but constrained by structural factors – institutional weakness, securitizing public policies, and transnational competition for authority.
Cesari’s overall position is nuanced. She treats Ramadan as an important indicator of changing authority, an articulate advocate for minority jurisprudence and ethical publicness, and a pragmatic interlocutor for European publics – but she refrains from celebratory claims that his model will by itself produce stable institutional integration. In short, Ramadan articulates resources for Muslim civic participation. Cesari shows why those resources are necessary but also why they are insufficient unless accompanied by institutional change and by an amelioration of the political contexts (securitization, discrimination) in which European Muslims live.
THE CRITICAL POINT OF VIEW: THE “DOUBLE DISCOURSE”
Many mainstream scholars like the above-mentioned Jocelyne Cesari adopt a more positive and mixed view (Kiwan 2020: 30–31, 91, 98, 116–117, 133, 168). They note Ramadan’s rhetorical flexibility but also identify genuinely re-formist elements in his engagement with European secularism and citizenship. He appears as an innovative – if sometimes ambiguous – theologian engaged in reconciling Islamic ethics with European civic norms. His work is read as part of a broader trajectory of Islamic reformism, not simply as a Muslim Brotherhood strategy.
From the other side, traditional Muslim scholars (particularly from the Middle East) criticize Ramadan for being too liberal and too accommodating to Western values. They argue that by reinterpreting Sharia to fit European life, he risks compromising divine commandments (Brown 2005; Zehani 2022).
Caroline Fourest and Paul Landau present different point of view: powerful, meticulously documented critiques of Tariq Ramadan’s “Euro-Islam”, but their analysis is shaped by polemical frameworks that treat political Islam as a monolithic and expansionist force. Their work illuminates important aspects of discourse, networks, and political context, yet tends to flatten the complexity of Ramadan’s reformist project.
In her book Frère Tariq Caroline Fourest develops the highly influential argument that Ramadan practices a “double discourse”: an accommodative and reformist language when addressing Western audiences, and a more conservative, Islamocentric language when speaking to Muslim audiences. This accusation is central to her claim that Ramadan’s project is not genuine theological reform but a political strategy aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood.
Fourest presents several examples of what she considers duplicity: Ramadan’s hesitance to condemn corporal punishments (the famous “moratorium” debate); his praise of conservative scholars like Yūsuf al-Qaradāwī; discrepancies between his French writings, Arabic speeches, and English publications; his rhetorical penchant for “ambiguity” when addressing contentious issues such as apostasy, gender, and Sharia (Fourest 2008: 109–195).
Fourest argues that this discursive ambivalence allows Ramadan to s multaneously appear as a liberal interlocutor to European elites while serving as a moral authority reinforcing conservative Islamic norms among European Muslims (Taddeo 2018).
Critics (including some reviewers in the French press) have charged Fourest with occasional factual slips, selective quotation, and a polemical tone that can compress complexity into binary judgments; this weakens her claim if one demands classical academic standards of hermeneutics and proportionality. In short: powerful for public argument, but contested in method and balance (Bredoux 2024).
In Le sabre et le Coran Landau reads Tariq Ramadan as a contemporary exponent of Muslim Brotherhood strategy: not a violent jihadi but a promoter of long-term political influence through ideas, institutions, and cultural work. Landau emphasizes strategy over theology – a continuity from Hassan al-Banna’s politics to contemporary “entryism” in Europe. He rejects the neat moderate/ extremist binary, arguing that strategy (propaganda vs. armed jihad) differentiates actors more than ultimate political intent (Landau 2005: 133–226).
Both Caroline Fourest and Paul Landau treat Tariq Ramadan not primarily as a theologian in isolation but as a political actor whose public discourse must be read in the context of broader Islamist strategy. Yet they arrive at that conclusion by different routes and with different emphases. Fourest foregrounds rhetorical doubleness, manipulation, and concrete social/political effects in France. Landau situates Ramadan within a longer history of the Muslim Brotherhood and frames his work as a strategic, soft-power project aimed at remaking European Muslim presence. Their convergent suspicion of Ramadan’s liberalizing label contrasts with many scholars who view aspects of his work as reformist or adaptive to European contexts.
Both are sceptical of the “moderate reformer” narrative, seeing Ramadan as politically consequential. But their approaches differ in scale (individual vs. movement), method (discourse vs. institutional analysis), and the type of risk they emphasize (social radicalization vs. ideological conquest).
Their work is important for anyone studying the intersection of Islam, politics, and Europe – but as with all critiques, it must be balanced with more sympathetic or theological readings of Ramadan if one wants a full picture. Ramadan has tried to deny all possible accusations (Buruma 2007).
Ultimately, Fourest and Landau raise legitimate questions that deserve academic consideration, but their readings cannot substitute for the nuanced, multidimensional approaches developed in sociology, anthropology, and Islamic studies. Understanding “Euro-Islam” requires attention to theology, context, and pluralism – not only to political networks and rhetorical disputes. Bringing polemical and scholarly analyses into dialogue enriches our understanding of Ramadan’s intellectual significance and the broader transformations of Islam in Europe.
This debate isn’t limited to secular Western critics: many of the voices critical of Ramadan (like Bassam Tibi and Walid al-Kubaisi) are themselves Muslims (or from Muslim background) and worry about the future of Muslim identity, integration, ethics, and pluralism. Their critique is often motivated by: a fear of political Islam, especially Islamist ideas entering European society under the radar; a desire for a liberal/ secular or pluralistic Europe, where Muslims can practice faith but also fully integrate and share civic values; concern about authenticity – i.e. that Islam should not be reduced to exploitative politics, opportunistic populism, or “double-speech”; and a desire to preserve egalitarian and humanistic values (gender equality, individual rights etc.) rather than a return to conservative/ traditionalist norms.
From their perspective, challenging someone like Ramadan is essential to prevent Islam from becoming a tool of political conservatism or covert “Islamisation” of European societies – while still allowing for a genuine Muslim identity.
Finally, it’s impossible to ignore that Ramadan’s sexual assault allegations (2017–2020) – which he denies – have deeply damaged his public credibility, especially in Europe. Even though those cases are legally complex and not all resolved, they have overshadowed his intellectual work, making his presence in Western academic and media spaces far less visible.
Yet despite these controversies, his books and lectures remain hugely influential in debates about Islam in Europe, Muslim citizenship, and intercultural ethics.
CONCLUSION
Tariq Ramadan is considered to be a bridge between Islamic and European cultures. He advocates for a model of Islam that is compatible with European values – a concept known as “Euro-Islam”. His goal is for Muslims in Europe to maintain their faith while fully participating in European civic life.
The metaphor of a bridge suggests mediation, dialogue, and synthesis. Ramadan seeks to connect two cultural and moral worlds often seen as incompatible. The “bridge” also implies mutual transformation: not just Muslims adapting to Europe, but Europe also learning from Islamic ethical and spiritual insights (“Islamic wisdom”).
European intellectuals have often accused him of “double discourse”: presenting a liberal face to Western audiences while preserving a traditionalist one for Muslim listeners. Meanwhile, his insistence on maintaining Islamic principles within secular societies unsettles those who prefer a strict separation of religion and public life. Within the Muslim world, his emphasis on contextual reasoning (ijtihād) and his rejection of literalism challenge established clerical authority. Ramadan thus stands at the intersection of two critiques – one fearing that he brings too much Islam into Europe, and the other that he brings too much Europe into Islam.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Literature
Ali, Kecia, Hammer, Juliane & Laury Silvers (eds). 2012. A Jihad for Justice: Honoring the Work and Life of AminaWadud. London: Amazon.
Bowen, John. 2009. Can Islam Be French? Pluralism and Pragmatism in a Secularist State. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Cesari, Jocelyne. 2004. When Islam and Democracy Meet: Muslims in Europe and in the United States. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Cesari, Jocelyne. 2012. “Securitisation of Islam in Europe”. Die Welt des Islams 52 (3/4): 430–449.
ChengQi. 2025. “The Practical Dilemma of Tariq Ramadan’s “Euro-Islam”. American Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences Research 9 (1): 124–131.
Hashas, Mohammed. 2019. The Idea of European Islam: Religion, Ethics, Politics and Perpetual Modernity. London – New York: Routledge.
Johnson, Ian. 2010. A Mosque in Munich: Nazis, the CIA, and the Rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in the West. Boston – New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.
Krämer, Gudrun. 2022. Der Architekt des Islamismus: Hasan al-Banna und die Muslimbrüder. München: Verlag C. H. Beck.
Landau, Paul. 2005. Le Sabre et le Coran: Tariq Ramadan et les Freres musulmans a la conquete de l’Europe. Monaco: Éditions du Rocher.
Ramadan, Tariq. 2004. Western Muslims and the Future of Islam. Oxford – New York: Oxford University Press.
Ramadan, Tariq. 2009. Radical Reform: Islamic Ethics and Liberation. Oxford – New York: Oxford University Press.
Ramadan, Tariq. 2010. To be a European Muslim: A Study of Islamic Sources in the European Context. Leicester: The Islamic Foundation.
Rawls, John. 2013. A Theory of Justice. Leiden – Boston: Brill.
Wagemakers, Joas. 2022. The Muslim Brotherhood: Ideology, History, Descendants. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
Willi, Victor J. 2021. The Fourth Ordeal: A History of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, 1968–2018. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Zehani, Abdeladim. 2022. “Who is Tariq Ramadan?”. International Journal of Academic Research in Business & Social Sciences 12 (5): 1996–2005.
Internet sources
Anonymous. 2019. “40 reasons why Tariq Ramadan is a reactionary bigot (2005)”. Libcom.org. https://libcom.org/ article/40-reasons-why-tariq-ramadan-reactionary-bigot-2005?utm_ source=chatgpt.com (accessed 14. 8. 2025).
Bredoux, Lénaïg. 2024. “Les mensonges de Caroline Fourest”. Le Club de Mediapart. https://blogs.mediapart.fr/ lenaig-bredoux/blog/130924/les-mensonges-de-caroline-fourest (accessed 18. 9. 2025).
Brown, Eric B. 2005. “After the Ramadan Affair: New Trends in Islamism in the West”. Hudson Institute. https:// www.hudson.org/human-rights/after-the-ramadan-affair-new-trends-in-islamism-in-the-west (accessed 10. 12. 2025).
Buruma, Ian. 2007. “Tariq Ramadan Has an Identity Issue”. The New York Times Magazine. https://www.nytimes. com/2007/02/04/magazine/04ramadan.t.html (accessed 14. 8. 2025).
De Taddeo, Christel. 2018. “Caroline Fourest à propos de Tariq Ramadan: “Je n’ai jamais croisé un manipulateur aussi dévastateur“. Le Journal de Dimanche. https://www.lejdd.fr/Societe/ caroline-fourest-a-propos-de-tariq-ramadan-je-nai-jamais-croise-un-manipu-lateur-aussi-devastateur-3564782?utm_ source=chatgpt.com (accessed 4. 9. 2025).
Fourest, Caroline. 2009. “Integration as Seen by Tariq Ramadan”. Caroline Fourest Official Blog. https://caroline-fourest.wordpress.com/2009/08/21/lintegration-vue-par-tariq-ramadan/?utm_ source=chatgpt.com (accessed 15. 10. 2025).
Fourest, Caroline. 2017. “Tariq Ramadan: The True Face of a Manipulator”. Marianne. https://www.marianne.net/ societe/tariq-ramadan-le-vrai-visage-dun-manipulateur-par-caroline-fourest?utm_source=chatgpt.com (accessed 21. 10. 2025).
Ibn Warraq. 2008. “The Pious Fraud Tariq Ramadan, Islamist and equivocator”. City Journal. https://www.city-jour-nal.org/article/the-pious-fraud?utm_ source=chatgpt.com (accessed 4. 12. 2025).
Lesprit, Hud. 2023. “Tariq Ramadan: The Incredible Deviance of a Reformist “Imam”. The Muslim Sceptic. https:// muslimskeptic.com/2023/05/24/tariq-ramadan/ (accessed 30. 9. 2025).
Ramadan, Tariq. 2005. “We must not accept this repression”. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/ 2005/mar/30/religion.uk (accessed 3. 12. 2025).
TARIK RAMADAN: KONTROVERZNI GLASNOGOVORNIK „EVROPSKOG ISLAMA“
Rezime: Tarik Ramadan je danas prepoznat kao jedna od najistaknutijih – ali i najkontroverznijih – figura u raspravama o islamu u Evropi. Njegov intelektualni projekat zasniva se na ideji „evropskog islama“, reformističke vizije koja podstiče muslimane da usklade islamske principe sa evropskim kulturnim, političkim i društvenim kontekstima. Ramadan smatra da muslimani u Evropi treba da odvoje islamska učenja od njihovih zemalja porijekla i reinterpretiraju ih u zapadnom okruženju, ostajući pritom vjerni temeljnim religijskim vrijednostima. Zalaže se za aktivno građanstvo, međureligijski dijalog i integraciju muslimana u evropska društva bez asimilacije. Međutim, koncept „evropskog islama“ je predmet brojnih polemika, naročito u poređenju s ranijom formulacijom Basama Tibija, koji je prvi uveo ovaj termin. Za Tibija, evropski islam podrazumijeva jasno prihvatanje sekularizma, demokratije, pluralizma i razdvajanja religije i države, odnosno svojevrsnu „evropeizaciju“ islama. On Ramadanov pristup kritikuje kao nedovoljno reformistički, opisujući ga čak kao oblik „salafijskog reformizma“, a ne istinsko prilagođavanje evropskim vrijednostima. Prema njegovom mišljenju, Ramadanov model nosi rizik očuvanja elemenata političkog islama koji nijesu kompatibilni s liberalnom demokratijom. Drugi autori zauzimaju nešto uravnoteženije stavove. Žoslin Sezari tumači evropski islam manje kao fiksiranu doktrinu, a više kao sociološki proces oblikovan svakodnevnim iskustvima muslimanskih zajednica u Evropi. Iz te perspektive, Ramadanov diskurs predstavlja pokušaj konstruisanja hibridnog identiteta, a ne koherentan ideološki program. Slično tome, Pol Landau i drugi autori ukazuju na šire političke i kulturne tenzije koje prate ovu raspravu, često je povezujući sa strahovima od islamizacije ili konceptom „Eurabije“, iako se takva tumačenja često kritikuju kao pretjerana ili polemična. Najoštrije kritike dolaze od novinara i esejista poput Karolin Fure. U svojoj knjizi Frère Tariq Fure prikazuje Ramadana kao suštinski ambivalentnu figuru koja navodno koristi „dvostruki diskurs“: umjeren, reformistički jezik za zapadnu publiku i konzervativniju ili islamističku poruku za muslimanske slušaoce. Ona tvrdi da se njegova misao u konačnici uklapa u ideološko nasljeđe Muslimanskog bratstva i da ne predstavlja istinsku modernizaciju islama. O ovoj kritici se iscrpno debatovalo, pri čemu je neki autori odbacuju kao pretjerano tumačenje bez presudnih dokaza. U cjelini, uloga Tarika Ramadana kao portparola „evropskog islama“ oslikava širu intelektualnu i političku borbu oko pozicije islama u Evropi. Dok ga jedni vide kao most između zajednica i zagovornika integracije i dijaloga, drugi u njegovom projektu prepoznaju nejasnoće ili čak ideološku opasnost. Razlike između Ramadana i Tibija, kao i suprotstavljena tumačenja Sezari, Fure i Landaua, ukazuju na to da „evropski islam“ nije jedinstvena doktrina, već osporavano polje ideja koje odražava dublje napetosti u vezi s identitetom, sekularizmom i pluralizmom u savremenoj Evropi.
Ključne riječi: Tarik Ramadan, „evropski islam“ („evroislam“), Muslimansko bratstvo, islamski reformizam, „dvostruki diskurs“
ENDNOTES
[1] foundation@theophanov.com.
SEPARAT RADA
Separat ovog rada (pdf), objavljenog u četvrtom broju časopisa Konteksti kulture: studije iz humanistike i umjetnosti (2026), možete preuzeti klinom na ovaj link.